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TEACHING LAW STUDENTS TO COMFORT THE
TROUBLED AND TROUBLE THE COMFORTABLE: †
AN ESSAY ON THE PLACE OF POVERTY LAW IN THE
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
Robert Hornstein ††
I walked a mile with Pleasure;
She chattered all the way,
But left me none the wiser
For all she had to say.
I walked a mile with Sorrow
And ne’er a word said she;
But oh, the things I learned from her
1
When Sorrow walked with me.
In September of 2008, Associate Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia addressed a gathering of the Federalist Society at
2
Chicago’s Union League Club. In his address, Scalia reminisced
about his days as a law student and shared with his audience that
† Steven Banks, the Attorney-in-Chief of the Legal Aid Society in New York
City, used this phrase in an interview he gave to journalist Elizabeth Kolbert in
1999 for an article in The New Yorker magazine about the plans of New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to throw uncooperative families out of New York City’s
homeless shelters. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Around City Hall, THE NEW YORKER, Dec.
17, 1999, at 40. Banks used the phrase to describe his work as a poverty lawyer
representing New York City’s homeless. See id.
†† Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. The author
thanks Professor Christopher Roderer, Daniel Atkins, and Maria Soto for their
many valuable comments. Special thanks to my wife, Corrine Hornstein, for
tirelessly reading the earlier drafts and for her wise insights.
1. Robert Browning Hamilton, Along the Road, in FIRST LOVES: POETS
INTRODUCE THE ESSENTIAL POEMS THAT CAPTIVATED & INSPIRED THEM 27 (2002).
2. Abdon M. Pallasch, Scalia Says U. of C. Has Gone Liberal, CHI. SUN TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.suntimes.com/news/education/
1168064,scalia091708.article.
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when he was in law school, he “took nothing but bread-and-butter
3
classes, not ‘Law and Poverty,’ or other made-up stuff.” Justice
Scalia also counseled his audience on what courses he thinks law
4
students should be taking in law school. According to Justice
5
As for the
Scalia, law students should “take serious classes.”
rewards of taking a course such as poverty law, he cautioned:
6
“Don’t waste your time.” So, in sharing this advice, did Justice
Scalia in some way mean to suggest that the legal interests of the
poor should rightfully occupy a peripheral, or perhaps even
inferior, place in legal education and the legal system? Regrettably,
7
this may be the case.
Justice Scalia has previously signaled how he values the legal
interests of the poor. His dissenting opinion in Legal Services
8
Corporation v. Velazquez offers a measure of insight into where he
would place his thumb on the scales of justice in weighing the
poor’s legal interests, and in particular, how Justice Scalia calibrates
equal access to legal counsel for the poor. In Velazquez, the Court
struck down a legislative restriction that prohibited federally
funded Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) program lawyers from
undertaking representation in cases that involve “an effort to
9
amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.” The LSC
promulgated a regulation that prohibited LSC lawyers from
challenging the constitutionality of welfare laws on behalf of their
10
impoverished clients. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, rejected the argument that the statutory provision
prohibiting LSC lawyers from raising constitutional challenges was
essentially harmless because the LSC lawyer could withdraw from
11
representation. Justice Kennedy found the remedy of withdrawal
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence and the Good Society:
Shades of Felix Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950’s,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1801 (1991) (describing how Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence of neutral principles often results in a lack of judicial protection for
the poor); Toby Golick, Justice Scalia, Poverty and the Good Society, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1817, 1817–18 (1991) (arguing Justice Scalia’s conception of the proper
arrangement of our governmental structure precludes the poor from seeking aid
from the courts in enforcing statutory rights to governmental benefits).
8. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
9. Id. at 537.
10. Id. at 538–39.
11. Id. at 546.
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“even more problematic because in cases where the attorney
withdraws from a representation, the client is unlikely to find other
12
The likelihood of such a result troubled Justice
counsel.”
Kennedy because the “explicit premise for providing LSC attorneys
is the necessity to make available representation ‘to persons
13
financially unable to afford legal assistance.’”
Writing in dissent, however, Justice Scalia was not troubled by
the possibility that an impoverished person could not find
substitute counsel. According to Justice Scalia, the possibility that a
poor person would be unable to retain substitute counsel “is surely
irrelevant, since it leaves the welfare recipient in no worse condition
than he would have been in had the LSC program never been
enacted [because] . . . even if welfare claimants cannot obtain a
lawyer anywhere else, the Government is not required to provide
14
For Justice Scalia, no matter how severely the statutory
one.”
restriction trenches upon the ability of LSC lawyers to provide an
equal measure of meaningful representation for the poor, there
15
nevertheless is no constitutional foul. This is so since in the first
instance, the poor’s access to legal counsel through the LSC is
16
nothing more or less than a matter of legislative grace.
Justice Scalia’s view that poverty law is not a serious course
echoes a nagging truth: poverty law and the broader concern of
social justice have always held a sort of second-class citizenship
within the modern architecture of the law school curriculum and
17
in the legal academy as well. The historical pedigree of Justice
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2996a(3) (2001)).
14. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., M. H. Hoeflich, Symposium, Introduction, 38 EMORY L.J. 565, 568–
70 (1989) (explaining poverty law is not as promising a field of study for
theoretical scholarship and is usually considered peripheral to the core
curriculum); Emily J. Sack, The Burial of Family Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 459, 479 n.128
(2008) (explaining that one of family law’s characteristics as a gender-identified
course is that, like poverty law, it traditionally has been considered “softer” law, as
compared to core subjects such as constitutional law, evidence and corporations);
Amy L. Wax, Symposium, Musical Chairs and Tall Buildings: Teaching Poverty Law in
the 21st Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1363 (2008) (stating that “[p]overty
has never been considered a mainstream part of the law school curriculum; nor
has it commanded a central place in legal scholarship.”). See also Jerold S.
Auerbach, What Has the Teaching of Law to Do with Justice?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457,
471 (1978) (discussing how clinical professors “seem to float at the margin of their
professional culture” and “are considered less intellectual and less academic”);
Steven K. Berenson, A Primer for New Civil Law Clinic Students, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV.
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Scalia’s view is inextricably bound up with the question of the
proper role and function of law schools, and for that matter, the
18
law itself. Poverty law, while having both a doctrinal and clinical
presence in the academy and the law school curriculum for several
19
decades now, has yet to enjoy complete academic acceptance. To
this day, it continues to occupy what has been described as a
20
peripheral presence in the law school curriculum.
Rather than being consigned to the margins of the law school
curriculum, however, poverty law and social justice should be
prominent fixtures in legal education and should be central
institutional concerns of the nation’s law schools. More precisely,
poverty law should be a required and animating element of today’s
law school curriculum. The reasons why are drawn not from the
classroom but from the pages of history and the pressing demands
of civil society. In a political instant, hundreds of billions of dollars
in corporate welfare is dispensed to the architects of the subprime
21
mortgage crisis and to our nation’s largest banks and insurers, but
years are devoted to debating the wisdom of providing poor
22
For decades,
families and children with a stronger safety net.
corporate chief executives were handsomely rewarded for
leadership that resulted in harm to their companies and the loss of
23
thousands of jobs. But only now that the nation faces economic
603, 625 (2007) (noting that historically, clinical legal education has had a
subordinate status in the academy).
18. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Enough?,
17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 583, 583, 591 (1998) (questioning whether law schools are
“educating students for technical proficiency, but failing to inculcate in them a
proper sense of their social and public responsibilities as members of the legal
profession” and arguing that “law schools, and particularly law teachers, have a
‘moral responsibility’ to democratize our legal culture.”) [hereinafter Wizner, Is
Learning].
19. See Hoeflich, supra note 17, at 570; Wax, supra note 17, at 1363.
20. See Hoeflich, supra note 17, at 570; Wax, supra note 17, at 1363.
21. See Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Insurers and Automakers in Time for
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B1; Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Insurers
Are Getting in Line for Piece of Federal Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B1; Bob
Herbert, Op-Ed., Lost in a Flood of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at A17; Andrew
Ross Sorkin, G.M. Speeds Hat in Hand to Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, at B1.
See also David Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633
(2004) (detailing the debate surrounding the passage of 1996 welfare reform);
Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., A Swarm of Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A23; Julie
Scelfo, After the House Is Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at D1.
22. See Peter S. Goodman, From Welfare Shift in ’96, ’08 Reminder for Clinton,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, at A1; Rachel L. Swarns, State Programs Add Safety Net for
the Poorest, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2008, at Al.
23. See Jenny Anderson, Congress Questions Executives on Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
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collapse has this paradox of executive performance and
compensation been called into serious question. Nearly thirtyseven million Americans live in poverty and many millions more
24
dwell within a week’s wage of poverty. The economic peril that
the country currently faces reveals the fragility of our conventional
measures and definitions of poverty. Around the world, 1.4 billion
25
The
people subsist on slightly more than one dollar a day.
American worker is more productive than ever before, but more
26
Over forty-seven million
economically vulnerable to poverty.
Americans lack access to healthcare insurance and millions more
27
lack adequate access. Beyond the anonymity of these statistics, it
is possible for a child in America to die for want of access to dental
28
care —for no reason other than poverty.
These social and
economic conditions present a compelling tableau of reasons why
there is both a place in the law school curriculum for the study of
poverty law, and a pressing and critical educational, professional,
and public need. This Essay addresses the role and place of poverty
law in today’s law school curriculum.
Before I proceed further, I wish to make three preliminary
acknowledgments. First, I want to recognize the rich, textured, and
elegantly thoughtful body of scholarship on poverty law that has
been produced over the last five decades. Consequently, this Essay
does not arrive on a fresh canvas. Quite to the contrary, it draws
upon and benefits greatly from the wisdom and insights of the
many scholars, both doctrinal and clinical, as well as poverty law
practitioners, who have contributed to the development of that
body of work. For this reason, and as a matter of blunt candor, I
Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/business/07cndpay.html; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Banker Bonuses Are “Shameful,”
Obama Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1.
24. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POVERTY AND HARDSHIP AFFECT
TENS OF MILLIONS OF AMERICANS (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/12-20-07pov.pdf.
25. In August of 2008, the World Bank estimated 1.4 billion people in the
developing world live on less than $1.25 a day. The World Bank, New Data Show
1.4 Billion Live on Less Than US $1.25 a Day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains
Strong, Aug. 26, 2008, http://go.worldbank.org/K3Z8CEDJI0.
26. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Working Poor and Young Are Hit Hard in Economic
Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A26. See Steven Greenhouse & David
Leonhardt, Real Wages Fail to Match a Rise in Productivity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006,
at A1.
27. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF
AMERICANS WHO ARE UNINSURED CLIMBS AGAIN (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/8-2807pov.pdf. See also Mary Otto, Hidden Hurt, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2008, at W08.
28. Mary Otto, For Want of a Dentist, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at B1.
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disclaim any pretense of originality. Second, I make no attempt
nor lay any claim to providing a full accounting of the literature in
the narrow space of this Essay. Third, this Essay is animated as
much by the experiences that informed my life as a poverty lawyer
as by pedagogical concerns and interests.
Returning to Justice Scalia’s appearance at the Chicago Union
League in September 2008, his explanation of why law students
should not take courses that address the legal needs of the poor
puts into clear focus one of the most enduring criticisms of poverty
law―that it is not a legitimate area of legal study. For this reason,
29
Justice Scalia’s reprove that poverty law is “made-up stuff,” offers a
useful starting point, which is the often difficult matter of defining
poverty law. Professor Martha Davis, in her recent article, The
30
Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in the Old and New Curriculum,
which appeared in a recent Symposium issue of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal on the role of poverty law in today’s law school
curriculum, noted that almost four decades ago, Professor Thomas
Quinn began a poverty law teaching conference by posing the
31
question: “What is poverty law?”
Professor Amy Wax, another contributor to the same
Symposium, observed that:
Because poverty law is not a core part of a traditional legal
education, it has no standard, agreed-upon curriculum.
What is taught in poverty law is up for grabs and is heavily
influenced by the interests and convictions of the faculty
instructor. Not surprisingly, courses are highly variable,
and their contents have evolved in response to political
developments and shifting notions on the causes and
32
cures of economic disadvantage.
A third participant in the Symposium, Professor Stephen
Loffredo, explained that poverty law “now carries an array of
33
Notably, however, each of these three
overlapping meanings.”
observations―by scholars who have written and thought about the
contours and importance of poverty law for many years―reveals
that the task of setting out a uniform and universally accepted
29. Pallasch, supra note 2.
30. Martha F. Davis, Symposium, The Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in the
Old and New Curriculum, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2007).
31. Id.
32. Wax, supra note 17, at 1364.
33. Stephen Loffredo, Symposium, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural
Constitutional Law Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1240 (2007).
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definition of poverty law is probably not achievable in any
normative sense.
Nevertheless, as used in this Essay, poverty law is not divorced
from the formal canonical subjects, structures, and conventions
that underlie our legal system. Poverty law instead embraces a
broad field of substantive and procedural inquiry directed at
learning and understanding how and why existing legal structures
and ordinary legal conventions can disadvantage the poor as well as
what legal mechanisms can aid the poor. As I use the term
“poverty law” in this Essay, it embraces teaching students to use
their technical competencies as lawyers to address and to remediate
those disadvantages that burden the poor. And for this reason,
poverty law, as used in this Essay, necessarily embraces teaching law
students to care about justice and equality, teaching them that
justice and equality matter, and to pursue both in the course of
their lives as lawyers. As Professor Bryan Stevenson eloquently
34
stated, “[t]he opposite of poverty is not wealth,” it is “justice.”
This simple truth lies at the heart of any definition of poverty law.
A broader question, however, is what, if anything, does justice
35
have to do with the mission of law schools and legal education?
Legal education for the past three centuries has been neither a
36
fixed or static process. While law schools in many respects have
been tradition bound regarding both the content of the standard
curriculum and the academic study model of legal education, the
last few decades have witnessed a number of significant changes.
34. Andrea Saenz, Hundreds Gather for Celebration of Public Interest, HARV. L.
RECORD, Mar. 20, 2008, at News, available at http://media.www.hlrecord.
org/media/storage/paper609/news/2008/03/20/News/Hundreds.Gather.For.C
elebration.Of.Public.Interest-3278485.shtml.
35. Three decades ago, Professor Jerold Auerbach examined this question in
an insightful article entitled What Has the Teaching of Law To Do with Justice?. See
generally Auerbach, supra note 17.
36. See generally Talbot D’Alemberte, Teaching About Justice and Social
Contributions, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 363 (1992); Russell Engler, From 10 to 20: A Guide
to Utilizing the MacCrate Report Over the Next Decade, 23 PACE L. REV. 519 (2003);
Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law
Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs.
the Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf,
34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351 (1998); John O. Sonsteng, Donna Ward, Colleen Bruce &
Michael Petersen, A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the TwentyFirst Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303 (2007); Stephen Wizner, What Is a Law
School?, 38 EMORY L.J. 701 (1989); ABA, Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, MacCrate Report, An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, July 1992,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html.
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Lawyering skills, clinical and externship programs, the expansion
of elective courses, the establishment of legal writing programs, a
greater emphasis on professionalism, and a movement toward
bridging the gap between doctrinal instruction and skills
instruction are all easily recognizable signposts in virtually every
37
Law schools, members of the
American law school today.
academy, and other interested stakeholder organizations continue
to recognize that new approaches are needed to educate and
38
prepare law students for the practice of law. Yet, while the precise
contours of the standard curriculum have and continue to undergo
change, curricular change has not yet led to a full embrace or
endorsement of a social justice mission for law schools. Professor
William Quigley argues that social justice is a “counter-cultural
39
value” in law school and the legal profession.
37. See generally Kara Abramson, “Art for a Better Life:” A New Image of American
Legal Education, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 227 (2006); Jessica Dopierala, Bridging the
Gap Between Theory and Practice: Why Are Students Falling Off the Bridge and What Are
Law Schools Doing to Catch Them?, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 429 (2008); Robert A.
Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REV 945 (1991); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, 2007 Symposium on the Future of Legal Education, 60 VAND. L. REV. 325
(2007).
38. See, e.g., Symposium, Taking Law and ___ Really Seriously: Before, During and
After “The Law,” 60 VAND. L. REV. 555 (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) (prepared by
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching) [hereinafter
CARNEGIE STUDY]. The Carnegie Study found that “law schools could benefit from
ideas drawn from the education of physicians, teachers, nurses, engineers, and
clergy . . . .” Id. at 185. The authors of the study highlighted the absence of a
sufficiently strong bridge between legal thinking and the application of that
knowledge to day-to-day practice concerns. Id. at 188. A second key limitation is a
lack of attention to developing “the ethical and social dimensions of the
profession.” Id. While the study does not address social justice or poverty law as a
separate element, it does examine the need for the educational process to account
for the moral and ethical development of students in the context of what the
authors describe as the “apprenticeship of professionalism.” Id. at 126–39. In this
context, the study touches briefly on the potential of pro bono work as an
ingredient in the calculus of students’ moral development. Id. at 138. See also
Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps
We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 115 (2001) (quoting Gary Bellow,
On Talking Tough to Each Other: Comments on Condlin, 33 LEGAL EDUC. 619, 622
(1983)) (explaining that by the mid-1980s, then current methods of education
“‘[did] not properly prepare students to practice law.’”); Irene Scharf, Nourishing
Justice and the Continuum: Implementing a Blended Model in an Immigration Law Clinic,
12 CLINICAL L. REV. 243, 274 (2005) (noting that students who participate in the
Southern New England School of Law Immigration Law Clinic “experience . . . the
variety of practices that characterize effective lawyering.”).
39. William P. Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice,
1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 7, 9–11 (2007).
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Almost two decades ago, Professor David Barnhizer authored
40
He
an article entitled “The Justice Mission of Law Schools.”
began by observing that “[m]ost faculty in American law schools
would deny the appropriateness of any mission that requires them
41
Professor Barnhizer
to either understand or advance justice.”
explained further that the minority of faculty who, at that time,
would support the idea that social justice is a proper mission of law
schools “would dissipate abruptly if anyone attempted to be specific
42
in terms of the obligation.” While both of Professor Barnhizer’s
observations are probably as true today as they were nearly two
decades ago, the case for making justice a core concern of legal
education remains compelling.
Much, if not most of what we celebrate as a people is anchored
to our devotion to the law and the enduring struggle to achieve a
more just society. From our founding as a nation, to our rebirth in
1865, and continuing through the modern civil rights era, the most
distinctive ingredient of our national ethos has been a maturing
concern for justice. The current struggle over extending a full
measure of civil rights to gay men and women, including
guaranteeing them full participation in our civil institutions,
43
If this is
reflects our continuing national discourse on justice.
indeed true, then it would seem that justice has a great deal to do
40. David Barnhizer, The Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 285 (1992).
41. Id. at 286. See also Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 583 (discussing
how many law professors would claim that moral instruction is inappropriate and
arguing “most law school graduates . . . [enter] the profession with only the
vaguest sense of their . . . obligations to the public.”).
42. Barnhizer, supra note 40, at 286 n.3. The Carnegie Study observed that
“efforts to add new requirements are almost universally resisted, not only in legal
education but in professional education generally . . . .” CARNEGIE STUDY, supra
note 38, at 190.
43. See Patrick Healy, Hopefuls Differ as They Reject Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2008, at A1 (discussing the same-sex marriage views of then Senator Barack
Obama and Senator John McCain); Jessie McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3
States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1 (discussing the passage of
same-sex marriage bans in Arizona, California, and Florida). See also In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (stating that “limiting the designation of
marriage to a union ‘between a man and a woman’ [in California’s state statute] is
unconstitutional . . . .”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482
(Conn. 2008) (“[G]ay persons are entitled to marry the . . . same sex partner of
their choice.”); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968
(Mass. 2003) (“Limiting the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
to opposite-sex couples violates the basic premises of individual liberty and
equality under law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.”).
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44

with the mission of law schools.
Technical and professional
competency divorced from an understanding and concern for
justice produces a profession ill prepared to respond to the
45
And a lack of
“concrete realities” of the human condition.
interest in the latter produces and perpetuates the type of social
and economic conditions that tear at the very foundations of our
democracy. The analytical, technical, and practice skills that form
the centerpiece of a legal education should be informed by a
concern for justice. Almost four decades ago, the Supreme Court’s
46
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly gave eloquent voice to the social and
moral conundrum of poverty amidst plenty. In Goldberg, Justice
William Brennan, writing for the majority, explained:
From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has
been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces
not within the control of the poor contribute to their
poverty. This perception, against the background of our
traditions, has significantly influenced the development of
the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by
meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring
within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the
life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards
against the societal malaise that may flow from a
widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity.
Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to

44. See John O. Calmore, “Chasing the Wind”: Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming
Legal
Mis-Education,
and
Engaging
in
Professional
Re-Socialization,
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167 (2004) (noting “social justice is imperative for lawyers to
heed their public calling in the truest sense.”); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting
Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2
CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 38–39 (1995) (discussing various arguments that “support the
notion that lessons of social justice are a necessary part of legal education
generally, and clinical education in particular.”).
45. Justice Brennan used the term, “concrete realities,” to explain his
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), as “an expression of the
importance of passion in governmental conduct, in the sense of attention to the
concrete human realities at stake.” William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and
“The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 20 (1988). See also Steven Wizner,
Passion in Legal Argument and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Comment on Goldberg v.
Kelly, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 179, 179 (1988) (quoting Brennan, supra at 11) (noting
that “judging . . . involves the interaction of reason and passion, of logic and
experience, in a ‘dialogue between head and heart.’”).
46. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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“promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
47
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”
Goldberg v. Kelly, however, offers us more than just an eloquent
and thoughtful expression of the role and responsibility of
government to act for the good of its people—it also teaches us
about lawyering and the public good. That is, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Goldberg teaches us that injustice and poverty are
inextricably linked. Justice Hugo Black, who dissented in Goldberg,
offered sharp disagreement with the majority’s recourse to the
Fourteenth Amendment as a source for procedural protections for
48
the poor. Justice Black also expressed great alarm over what he
49
saw as an unwarranted intrusion into a field of state operation.
Nevertheless, Justice Black recognized the pressing need to address
what he described as “[t]he dilemma of the ever-increasing poor in
50
the midst of constantly growing affluence . . . .”
No doubt, the call for our law schools to take on a social justice
mission is not a new one. However, it remains a mission that has
yet to be accepted by most law schools. Charles Hamilton
Houston’s stewardship of Howard University Law School offers the
clearest, if not the best, example of what can be accomplished
51
when a law school is institutionally committed to social justice.
Houston inculcated his students at Howard with the importance of
lawyering for the public good and prepared and trained his
52
Thurgood
students to challenge and dismantle segregation.
53
54
55
Robert Carter,
Oliver Hill,
and Spottswood
Marshall,
47. Id. at 264–65. Justice Scalia, however, would characterize this type of
decision-making as “abstract moralizing.” See Bradley Vasoli, Scalia Lambasts
“Abstract Moralizing,” PHILADELPHIA BULL., Oct. 28, 2008, at 3.
48. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 275–77 (Black, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 279.
50. Id. at 272.
51. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 128–145 (Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1976). See also MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–61 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
52. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Charles Hamilton
Houston and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
17, 21–22 (1998) (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 595,
599 (1993)) (noting that Houston’s “unrelenting vision of creating a school for the
training of ‘Black lawyers who would actively and aggressively represent and
advocate for the rights of the Black citizenry . . . .’”). See also KLUGER, supra note
51, at 128 (“Howard Law School became a living laboratory where civil-rights law
was invented by teamwork.”).
53. Thurgood Marshall graduated first in his class at Howard Law School and
later became the chief attorney and legal strategist for the NAACP in the fight to
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56

Robinson all studied at Howard under Charles Hamilton
57
Houston. Each of these men went on to change the course of our
nation’s history by using their legal training as lawyers for the
NAACP in its historic fight to help dismantle Jim Crow
58
Professor Linda Greene, who explored the social
segregation.
mission of law schools nearly twenty years ago, pointed to the work
of Jean and Edgar Cahn at Antioch Law School as another example
“of the possibility of a law school’s institutional responsibility for
59
justice.” The Cahns, who were the founding co-deans, established
Antioch Law School to provide access to underserved,
impoverished communities and used clinical education as a key
60
Social justice was the
ingredient in their educational model.

end segregation. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 128, 214. Marshall went on to argue
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). President John F. Kennedy
appointed Marshall to the federal appellate bench in 1961, and four years later
President Lyndon Johnson convinced Marshall to step down and serve as Solicitor
General. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 760. Two years later, President Johnson made
the historic nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the United States Supreme
Court. In 1967, Marshall became the first African American to serve on the high
court. Id.
54. Robert Carter, like Thurgood Marshall, was a graduate of Howard
University’s law school. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: HOW A
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 34 (Basic
Books 1994). Carter was Thurgood Marshall’s first assistant counsel at the Legal
Defense Fund. Id. Carter would later be appointed to the federal bench as a
United States District Court Judge in New York. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 775.
55. Oliver Hill graduated in 1933 from Howard University Law School. JAMES
T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS
TROUBLED LEGACY 28 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). Hill was one of only a handful of
African Americans admitted to the Virginia Bar in the 1950s. See KLUGER, supra
note 51, at 128. Hill was counsel in a number of major Legal Defense Fund school
segregation cases in Virginia. Id. He would become the first African American
elected to the city council of Richmond, Virginia. Id.
56. Spottswood Robinson, III was another Howard Law School graduate who
was an important participant in many Legal Defense Fund cases. GREENBERG,
supra note 54, at 35. Robinson became dean of Howard’s law school in 1960 and
was later appointed to the federal appellate bench. Id.
57. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 128, 273, 471. See also Professor Florence
Wagman Roisman, Presentation at Great Lawyers and Judges Series, Indiana
University School of Law—Indianapolis (Feb. 12, 2002) (presenting the life,
contributions, and influence of Charles Hamilton Houston in the history of the
United States).
58. See GREENBERG, supra note 54, at 26–41.
59. Linda Greene, The Justice Mission of the Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
353, 354 (1992).
60. Laura C. Lawson, Antioch Law School: Business as Un-usual, 38 NLADA
BRIEFCASE, 13–14 (Summer 1981).
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61

hallmark of Antioch Law School’s educational mission.
In 2008, the issue of social justice and its role and place in
legal education continued to occupy the attention and concern of
62
poverty law scholars. Professor Marie Failinger, in examining the
role and place of poverty law in the mission of the law school, offers
a cautious but hopeful vision for the future:
[t]he poor in our society, however, pose a compelling
challenge to the American legal community. Not only
have they been the subject of intense academic study, not
only do they live in one of the richest nations in human
history (whose social, economic, and educational benefits
are supposed to trickle down to them), but they also live
in a country whose dedication to the protection of human
rights through law is among the highest in history. In
such a setting, the widespread existence of the desperate
poor . . . is a profound moral puzzle.
. . . Whether law schools, as teachers to the bar, look upon
their
work as educating public citizens, skilled
technicians, counselors, advocates, or transformational
leaders, the infusion of poverty law and poor clients into
the whole life of the law school offers some hope that
passion, responsibility, and optimism will win out over
denial, withdrawal, and skepticism. That, itself, should be
63
worth the candle.
Despite the fact that for several decades there have been
continuing calls to take on a social justice mission, the hard truth is
that these calls have mainly gone unheeded. Ultimately, however,
whether law schools and the academy choose to take on this
64
mission is a value judgment. This judgment is a collective one
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, Symposium, A Home of Its Own: The Role of
Poverty Law in Furthering Law Schools’ Missions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1173, 1175
(2007) (arguing that poverty law can be a key piece in the curriculum of law
schools that define their mission, at least in part, as educating lawyers as public
citizens, skilled technicians, skilled counselors, advocates on behalf of a cause, or
as transformational leaders).
63. Id. at 1218.
64. See, e.g., Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 591 (“Law schools, and
particularly law teachers, have a ‘moral responsibility’ to democratize our legal
culture. They must teach and inculcate in their students the professional
obligation of providing and supporting legal services for the poor.”). See also
Russell Engler, From the Margins to the Core: Integrating Public Service Legal Work Into
the Mainstream of Legal Education, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 479, 485 (2006) (“Numerous
studies reveal the extent to which the values of law students are shaped by their law
school experiences and those experiences typically push students away from,
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that has been made not only by law schools and the academy but
also by the profession.
Inevitably, the path of academic
achievement in law schools leads to coveted positions with private
65
law firms. There is a well-traveled path between high academic
achievement in law school and practice at large firms, both of
66
which represent principally corporate and commercial interests.
Almost ninety years ago in a series of lectures to his first-year
law students at Columbia University, Professor Karl Llewellyn
67
examined the use of the law as a route to material success.
Llewellyn observed:
There is a brand of lawyer for whom law is the making
of a livelihood, a competence, a fortune. Law offers
means to live, to get ahead. It is so viewed. Such men give
their whole selves to it, in this aspect. Coin is their
reward. Coin makes it possible to live. Coin is success,
68
coin is prestige, and coin is power.

rather than toward, public interest work.”).
65. See Frances Ansley, Starting With the Students: Lessons from Popular Education,
4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 7, 29 (1994) (pointing out that the traditional
grading system operates to identify students for large firm work and that
“placement offices devote a great deal of time and energy to attract large firms for
interviews and to smooth the path for a select number of . . . graduates into slots in
those firms.”); Maria L. Ciampi, The I and Thou: A New Dialogue for the Law, 58 U.
CIN. L. REV. 881, 899 (1990) (“Students frequently compete for the highest grades
solely to be able to go to the large firms which pay enormous salaries.”); David C.
Vladeck, Hard Choices: Thoughts for New Lawyers, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 354
(2001) (observing that the poor’s lack of access to legal counsel “begins in law
schools, and our nation’s law schools are at least complicit in building the
hydraulic pressure on young graduates to seek out corporate law firm jobs . . . .”).
66. See Vladeck, supra note 65, at 354–55. See also D’Alemberte, supra note 36,
at 369–70 (“By screening law students and sorting them out, we legal educators
ease the burden of selections for law firms. By socializing law students to think
that they should go where the ‘interesting work’ is, we precondition them to
accept this employment.”); Vincent R. Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the
Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 359, 397 (1990) (“Students are taught—implicitly, if not explicitly—
that to be truly successful, one must earn high grades, write on law review, and
clerk for prestigious firms during the summer.”); Henry Rose, Law Schools Should
Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 447–48 (1992) (“Most of the resources
of the placement offices of American law schools are devoted to assisting students
find private employment. . . . For most schools, a prime measure of success is the
percentage of graduates who are initially employed in large, prestigious law
firms.”).
67. See, e.g., K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY
(1960).
68. Id. at 141.
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Nearly eight decades later, this remains true.
In fact, the
notion that the law is a pathway to power and prestige is perhaps
70
more true today than at any time before. Law schools, however,
can and should do more to offer all students a different path to
travel through the law and through life—a path along which coin is
not the standard measure of either success or prestige. This effort,
however, should not be directed principally for the benefit of
students who have already chosen not to pursue coin as their
reward. No, the effort must be directed for the benefit of all law
school students as well as the institutional health of the law school
itself. This requires making justice a concern for all lawyers and
elevating justice as a central concern of legal education.
Most law schools, however, usually confine matters of justice
and the legal status of the poor to legal clinics and a few courses
and seminars that concern legal philosophy, poverty, race, gender,
or disability. To this extent, the subject of poverty and the law in
71
today’s law schools is ghettoized. No doubt, clinical education
72
today is a component of virtually every law school curriculum, but
69. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 65, at 354–55; Quigley, supra note 39, at 9–11.
There is evidence, however, that a substantial number of students enter law school
imbued with idealism and a high level of interest in social justice. See Tan N.
Nguyen, An Affair to Forget: Law School’s Deleterious Effect on Student’s Public Interest
Aspirations, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 251, 256 (2008) (examining why the level of
interest in public interest work among law students declines by the final year of law
school and arguing one reason for the decline in student interest in public
interest law careers is that “[l]aw school faculty often explicitly convey a negative
image of what it means to practice public interest law to their students.”).
70. Rose, supra note 66, at 447–48; Vladeck, supra note 65, at 355. See also Jill
Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law
School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1698 (1993) (noting that content of law school
course offerings signals a heavy corporate bias, which serves to guide the flow of
the majority of students into corporate law).
71. See Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 586 (“Clinics are not integrated
into the mainstream curriculum. . . . [and] [i]n effect the law school division
between clinical and non-clinical education replicates the dual system of justice:
law for the affluent as distinct from law for the poor, the mainstream curriculum
as distinct from the clinical curriculum.”).
72. See DAVID A. SANTACROCE & ROBERT R. KUEHN, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
APPLIED LEGAL EDUC., REPORT ON THE 2007–2008 SURVEY (2008), available at
http://www.csale.org/CSALE.07-08.Survey.Report.pdf
[hereinafter
CSALE
SURVEY]. The CSALE Survey sought a range of information on law school clinical
and field placement programs from all 188 ABA fully accredited law schools. Id. at
1–2. Survey responses were received from 145 schools. Id. at 1. Both overall
enrollment at each responding school and clinical enrollment information was
collected. Id. at 2. See also James H. Backman, Practical Examples for Establishing an
Externship Program Available to Every Student, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 4–11 (2007)
(providing an overview of in-house clinical programs and externship involvement,
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most law school clinics give a relatively few number of students
limited exposure to the pressing legal plight and the many burdens
that fill the lives of the poor, and even more limited exposure to
74
examining the relationship between poverty and the law. That
said, it should indeed be noted and celebrated that many law
school clinics have done and continue to do enormously important
social justice impact work, and many clinical programs provide
75
invaluable individual representation both civilly and criminally.
76
But by and large, too few students can participate and too many
schools and students view a clinical experience more as an
opportunity to develop practice-ready skills than as an inquiry into
the role and function of justice, or the confluence of poverty and
77
the law.
and explaining the growth in externship placements). Professor Backman draws
on data reported in the ABA and Law School Admission Council’s annual Official
Guide to Law Schools. Id.
73. CSALE SURVEY, supra note 72, at 10 (revealing that at many schools, only a
relatively small percentage of enrolled students actually participate in live in-house
clinics). See also Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 586 (noting the lack of
funding and personnel for current law school clinical programs).
74. See Meredith J. Ross, A “Systems” Approach to Clinical Legal Education,
13 CLINICAL L. REV. 779, 779–81 (2007) (explaining a fundamental debate in
clinical education is whether the goal of a clinical program should be skills
acquisition or social justice); Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L.
REV. 327, 327–28 (2001) (explaining the “proper objective of clinical legal
education is to teach students about using the law to pursue social justice . . . .
[and that] client-centered legal services work is as important a way of teaching
about social justice as law reform litigation.”).
75. See Scharf, supra note 38, at 243–46 (noting the successes of the Southern
New England School of Law Immigration Law Clinic). See also BRANDT GOLDSTEIN,
STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BUNCH OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT—
AND WON 307 (Scribner 2005) (chronicling human rights litigation prosecuted by
law students at Yale Law School under Professor Harold Koh, and describing how
in 2001, Professor Koh told a new group of clinical students at the first meeting
that “[t]his course . . . is about saving people. And not just people you’ll be
helping, but all of you.”); Arturo J. Carillo, Bringing International Law Home: The
Innovative Role of Human Rights Clinics in the Transitional Legal Process, 35 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2004) (analyzing the successes of human rights law school
clinics); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive PublicInterest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 237 (2003) (noting most clinical programs
provide individual direct representation and noting a number of instances of law
school clinics doing controversial impact cases); Jan Stiglitz, Justin Brooks & Tara
Shulman, The Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects New Emerging Role in
Clinical Legal Education, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 413 (2002) (discussing the successes of
the California Innocence Project).
76. Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 586. See also CSALE SURVEY, supra
note 72, at 7.
77. Wizner, Is Learning, supra note 18, at 591–92. See also Sameer M. Ashar,
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There remains the question why a subject that in the words of
78
Justice Scalia is “made-up,” should occupy such a coveted space in
today’s law school curriculum, let alone support a new and
controversial institutional mission? This question in some measure
touches upon the problem of defining poverty law. First, it should
be pointed out that Justice Scalia’s criticism rests on the premise
that courses that he would consider serious are not made-up.
However, that premise is flawed because the schema of our
79
common law system is, so to speak, all made-up in the first instance.
You can quite literally throw a dart at a historical map of the
common law to demonstrate this point. Whether the subject is
administrative law, tort law, environmental law, consumer law,
constitutional law, remedies, civil procedure, property law,
corporations or any other subject area, “made-up stuff” is what gives
these and all other doctrinal areas of study content and continuing
vitality. Consider how Justice Scalia’s criticism fares against the
80
development and evolution of strict liability law. Just more madeup stuff? The concept of minimum contacts as a central organizing
81
principle in the ordering of personal jurisdictional concerns, and
82
the Mathews v. Eldridge due process three-factor balancing test,
83
and equal protection scrutiny analysis in constitutional law, are all
informed by what could readily be labeled as “made-up stuff.”
Admittedly, a lack of commonly recognized or agreed
substantive boundaries denies poverty law the status of a neatly
fenced-off doctrinal subject area. Poverty law, however, as either an
Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 357 (2008) (arguing
that “[p]oor people are not served well by the kinds of advocacy currently taught
and reinforced in most law clinics.”).
78. Pallasch, supra note 2.
79. See Roger J. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 52 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., Columbia
Univ. Press 1959) (stating “[e]very basic precedent was thus once made up out of
whole cloth woven by a judge.”); M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91
CAL. L. REV. 247, 249 (2003) (discussing how courts by default “are inventing
health law.”).
80. See generally Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., Justice Roger J. Traynor and the
Development of Strict Liability in Product Liability Cases, 53 CONN. B.J. 423 (1979)
(analyzing Justice Traynor’s development of strict liability in the context of
defective products).
81. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
82. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
83. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660–61 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority’s use of fundamental rights strict-scrutiny
analysis).
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area of study or an area of practice, has never been clothed with
tradition or simplicity. But these facts should present neither an
instructional obstacle nor a pedagogical justification for not
incorporating such a course into the required curriculum. It
matters not so much precisely what a particular course’s fine details
are as much as that the course places squarely before students the
taunting symmetries of the law. The purpose of requiring students
to take a poverty law course is to expose them to the complexity of
the legal interests of the poor, the promise of the law as an
institution capable of addressing and remediating injustice, and the
richness of lawyering on behalf of the poor in a nation committed
84
by its written constitution to equal justice.
Because a picture is worth a thousand words, I draw upon my
own recent experience in teaching poverty law in a classroom
setting to sketch a few illustrations of how professors can teach
students both competency and expose students to the taunting
symmetries of the law. One of the cases I assign in my poverty law
85
class is Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker. In
Rucker, the Supreme Court held that a statutory provision that
Congress enacted, and which amended the National Housing Act,
permits the eviction of an innocent public housing tenant when
another member of the tenant’s family, guest, or other person
under the tenant’s control has engaged in drug-related criminal
86
activity. Using the Chevron doctrine, the Supreme Court found
that Congress indeed intended to allow the eviction of innocent
tenants for the drug offenses of other persons and that the eviction
87
of innocent tenants does not present any constitutional problems.

84. See generally E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., Walking Against the Wind, 38
NLADA BRIEFCASE, 10–11 (Summer 1981) (explaining the challenges and rewards
of lawyering for the nation’s poor).
85. 535 U.S. 125 (2001).
86. Id. at 130. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2005). Following Rucker, the
statute was amended in a number of ways. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)(A)–(E) (2005).
The statute still permits eviction as authorized under Rucker but offers protections
for tenants, their family members, and guests or other persons under a tenant’s
control who are victims of domestic violence. Id. The domestic violence
exception to the statute has its limits. If the domestic violence poses an actual and
imminent threat to other tenants or employees, the statute permits the housing
authority to terminate the tenant’s lease. Id.
87. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 136. The Supreme Court first established the Chevron
doctrine in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
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I devote one class session to studying and exploring the legal
analysis in Rucker and a second class session on how it bears on the
interests of the poor and the abilities of lawyers to protect those
interests. The first class includes a conventional exploration of the
facts and discussion of the Court’s legal analysis and the arguments
raised by the parties. The discussion includes an examination of
the Court’s application of the Chevron doctrine, how it differed
from the Ninth Circuit’s application, and the Court’s rejection of
88
Fortunately, one or more
the tenants’ due process concerns.
students in the class always believe that the Court correctly decided
the case, that it was a fair decision, and that Congress has the right
to take tough measures to combat crime and drugs, especially when
the government provides a family housing. From there, I move to a
discussion of the 1986 Florida Supreme Court decision in Florida
89
Bar v. Rosen.
In Rosen, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the propriety of
a three-year suspension given to a Florida attorney who had been
90
The Florida Bar
convicted of cocaine drug-trafficking charges.
disagreed with the referee’s recommendation for a three-year
91
suspension and pressed for disbarment on appeal. The Florida
Supreme Court, however, found disbarment too severe under the
92
circumstances of the case. In reaching this conclusion, the court
explained that the “facts illustrat[ed] yet another tragedy related to
93
cocaine abuse.” Central to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
in Rosen was the attorney’s accomplishments in law school, his skill
and reputation as a tax lawyer, his authorship of articles on tax
matters, and his involvement as a lecturer in continuing legal
94
The Florida Supreme Court then
education programs.
contextualized the lawyer’s loss of control and involvement in drug
trafficking:
As is so often the case, Rosen’s productivity as a
member of society precipitously plummeted as he became
increasingly addicted to free-base cocaine. To his credit,
he quietly wound up his law practice towards the end of
1981, when he no longer felt able to adequately protect
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130, 135–36.
495 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1986).
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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the best interests of his clients. Unfortunately, however,
he had by then lost the ability to exercise such care for
himself, and continued to withdraw into the nightmarish
nether-world of cocaine addiction until he finally became
95
involved in drug trafficking in 1982.
Unlike the Florida Supreme Court in Rosen, the United States
Supreme Court in Rucker was far less forgiving of the troubles of
sixty-three-year-old Pearlie Rucker and her adult disabled daughter
who was arrested for possession of crack cocaine several blocks
96
from Pearlie’s Oakland Housing Authority apartment complex.
Pearlie Rucker had called the Oakland Housing Authority complex
home for almost two decades, but unlike the attorney in Rosen, she
had no professional standing or accomplishments that were
97
highlighted by the Court. More immediately, however, unlike the
98
attorney in Rosen, Rucker herself was entirely innocent.
The contrast between how Rucker and Rosen treated drug use
and drug-related criminal activity could not be sharper. Using that
contrast, I ask the class to consider “why?” Was it because Rucker
was poor and black and Rosen was white and a member of a
privileged profession? How, if at all, did poverty burden the
decisional outcome in Rucker? How did Pearlie Rucker’s status as a
poor American influence the result in her case? Do the ethics of
drug use turn on a person’s station in life?
The class is then asked to consider and compare the treatment
of Pearlie Rucker and her disabled daughter with the treatment of
the twenty-four-year-old daughter of former Florida Governor Jeb
Bush, who a few months before the Rucker decision had been
arrested for attempting to buy the drug Xanax with a fraudulent
99
Within hours of his daughter’s arrest, Governor
prescription.
Bush asked the public to respect his privacy, and quickly thereafter,
100
The class
his daughter entered a drug treatment program.
materials for Rucker also include an article that details Chief Justice
William Rehnquist’s own struggle with dependence on and misuse
of the prescription sedative Placidyl during his tenure on the

95. Id.
96. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
97. See id. at 1113–42.
98. Id.
99. Dana Canedy, Jeb Bush’s Daughter Is Arrested on Charge of Faking Prescription,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A12.
100. Id.
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101

Supreme Court.
I ask the class if these comparisons are fair and
whether they are in any way relevant or revelatory about how we
treat the poor differently in terms of legal rights and legal burdens.
Next, I ask the class why Congress does not craft a one-strike
policy for homeowners who claim a mortgage interest deduction
102
I ask why not implement
on their federal income tax statement.
a policy that bars any taxpayer from claiming the mortgage interest
deduction if any member of the family, a guest, or other person
subject to a family member’s control, engages in drug-related
activity. As in cases of public housing tenants who face eviction,
there would be no innocent homeowner defense and the person
accused of drug-related activity need not be convicted to trigger the
103
These questions seek to encourage students to
one-strike policy.
think about how the same or similar conduct can be viewed and
treated in radically different ways depending on the affected party’s
104
social and economic status.
Following an examination of these issues, I ask the students to
consider how they would defend a public housing client facing
eviction based on the drug-related or criminal activity of another
person, perhaps a child or guest. I return to a discussion of Rucker
to try and get the students to think about how they would defend a
client facing eviction under a standard that amounts to a form of
105
I ask them, “in light of Rucker, what defenses
strict liability.
remain available?” In Rucker, the Supreme Court noted that the
101. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in Rucker. See Alan
Copperman, Sedative Withdrawal Made Rehnquist Delusional in ’81, WASH. POST, Jan.
5, 2007, at A1. See also David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court:
The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000)
(documenting Justice Rehnquist’s overdependence on Placidyl).
102. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and
Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 673 (2002) (“The tax advantages associated with
home ownership are by far the largest federal housing subsidies, many times
greater than the housing subsidies for low-income people.”).
103. Under 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(iii)(A) (2001), a housing authority may
evict a tenant based on a covered person’s (family member, guest, or other person
under the tenant’s control) criminal activity “regardless of whether the covered
person has been arrested or convicted for such activity and without satisfying the
standard of proof used for a criminal conviction.”
104. See, e.g., Robert Hornstein, Treena Kaye, & Daniel Atkins, One Strike for the
Poor and How Many for the Rest of Us?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 66.
105. Rucker v. Davis, 535 U.S. at 134. See also Tamara R. Piety, The War on the
Poor—News from the Front: Department of Housing and Urban Development v.
Rucker, 38 TULSA L. REV. 385 (2002). See also Robert Hornstein, Mean Things
Happening in This Land: Defending Third Party Criminal Activity Public Housing
Evictions, 23 S.U. L. REV. 257, 266 (1996).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1

1078

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development confer discretion on local public housing authorities
106
to decide whether an eviction should be prosecuted.
We then
discuss whether an abuse of that discretion gives rise to a defense
based on the regulation conferring such discretion. In the course
of the discussion, we examine the usefulness of requesting a jury
trial in these types of evictions.
After exhausting an examination of what, if any, traditional
107
defenses remain available, I ask them to prepare a voir dire
examination for the next class. In that second class, I conduct a
voir dire exercise based on a post-Rucker criminal activity eviction.
For this exercise, I have the entire class serve as the venire panel.
Individual students take turns conducting a voir dire examination
of the class either as counsel for the housing authority or as counsel
for the tenant. The class, however, is told that they are to wear two
hats, one as a member of the venire panel and one as opposing
counsel. The exercise permits any student to tender an objection
to a question posed by the student conducting the voir dire
examination. Using Rucker as the legal framework, this jury
selection exercise brings to the fore issues of class, social status,
bias, and, very clearly, the concrete burdens that the law places on
an impoverished tenant.
Students are confronted with the
practical difficulties that inhere in defending the poor, including
trying to fashion a viable defense and selecting a jury that will sit in
judgment on a poor person’s legal rights.
Rucker, however, offers but one example of how poverty law
issues can inform instruction. In the context of contracts, the use
of remedy-stripping provisions that compel a forfeiture of jury trial
rights, waive or limit damage remedies, restrict the recovery of costs
108
and fees, or shift liability for fees and costs, and the use and
109
application of the doctrine of unconscionability, offer many types
of opportunities to examine poverty law issues. Professor Paul
Carrington, in his article Unconscionable Lawyers, argues that lawyers
106. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 129, 134. See also 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(l)(i) (2001)
(codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)vii(B)–(D) (2008)).
107. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Garcia, 871 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Mass. 2007)
(holding special circumstances defense under state law was preempted, but the
court left open the possibility a tenant could defend on the basis of an abuse of
discretion defense).
108. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses:
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 50 (2003).
109. See, e.g., Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 112–13 (N.J. 2006).
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have a duty to avoid using oppressive remedy-stripping clauses.
Carrington explores the contours of the duty, the potential for
substantive liability, and the moral restraints on lawyers drafting
111
and invoking oppressive remedy-stripping clauses.
I assign the
article and ask the students to consider the ethical implications of
the use of these types of contract provisions. I pose the question in
the context of a hypothetical representation.
Professor
Carrington’s article and his arguments offer a rich opportunity to
examine a wealth of issues, including the proper role and
responsibilities of lawyers as advocates, the impact of remedystripping devices on the poor’s access to the courts, and the proper
role and function of the courts in enforcing these types of
provisions.
We first examine the ethical question through the prism of the
lawyer’s duty to his client. The client might be a rent-to-own
furniture company, a used car dealer, a bank, or a private landlord.
Next, I ask the class to consider what, if any, duty exists to third
parties and to the public. I narrow the question to focus on the
ethical implications of lawyers invoking provisions that, by design,
are intended to deny persons access to the courts, deprive them of
important procedural rights, and foreclose any meaningful judicial
remedies. The class materials include selected Florida Rules of
112
Professional Conduct.
Next, the class is asked whether the rules have any application.
In this context, we explore how these types of remedy-stripping
provisions burden or benefit the adjudicative process and how they
burden the ability of persons to defend lawsuits or to press claims
for affirmative relief. We also consider how wealth and poverty
bear on the enforcement and efficacy of these provisions. I ask the
class how, if at all, remedy-stripping provisions weigh more heavily
on the poor than on others whose rights are similarly burdened or
extinguished by the use of such provisions. The discussion forces
students to reconcile a number of competing professional
obligations and moral impulses. Professor Carrington’s insights
110. Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 361–
62 (2002).
111. Id. at 364, 370, 379, 384, 391.
112. See FLA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-3.4 (fairness to opposing party); FLA. R.
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-4.4 (respect for the rights of third persons); FLA. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4-8.4 (conduct classified as misconduct). The Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct are found in Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar.
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place in sharp relief for students the moral dimensions of their
responsibilities as lawyers, the limits of zealous advocacy, and also
how wealth and poverty can weigh heavily on the calculus of justice.
A poverty law course offers virtually unbounded opportunities
to examine questions of justice and equality within the crucible of
practical lawyering concerns. But these opportunities are not
confined exclusively to a classroom poverty law course. Professor
Failinger explains that “the ways in which poverty law can be
infused into the life of a law school that trains its students to be
113
There are just as many
public citizens are manifold.”
opportunities to build poverty law issues and concerns into
conventional courses such as torts, property law, remedies and
114
In property courses, landlord-tenant
virtually any other course.
statutory schemes that favor property owners and disadvantage the
115
poor offer useful teaching tools to examine poverty law issues.
Tort law and tort reform implicate a range of poverty law concerns,
including the disparate impact that damage limitations have on the
116
poor and minorities.
Poverty law and social justice concerns
need not be ghettoized—they can be a vital and integral part of the
law school curriculum.
Returning to Justice Scalia, in 2008, he sat for an interview with
C-Span founder Brian Lamb to promote his book on legal writing,
Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges, which he co-authored
117
with Professor Bryan Garner. During the course of the interview,
Justice Scalia was asked how he would rate lawyers who have
118
His answer to that question
appeared in the Supreme Court.
113. Failinger, supra note 62, at 1188.
114. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Symposium, Poverty Law and Civil Procedure:
Rethinking the First-Year Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1325, 1325 (2007) (examining
“whether and how to integrate issues of poverty and inequality into the standard
first-year course on civil procedure.”).
115. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72–73 (1972).
116. Joanne Doroshow & Amy Widman, The Racial Implications of Tort Reform,
25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161, 161–62 (2007). See also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS
MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111–51 (2002) (asking if Helen Palsgraf’s poverty could have
been a decisive factor in the outcome of her famous 1928 case, Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Company, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)); Susan Carle & Michelle
Lapointe, Short Notes on Teaching About the Micro-Politics of Class, With Examples from
Torts and Employment Law Casebooks, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1129 (2008).
117. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
PERSUADING JUDGES (West Law School 2008).
118. Q&A: Justice Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court, http://www.q-anda.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1178 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/1

24

Hornstein: Teaching Law Students to Comfort the Troubled and Trouble the Com

2009]

POVERTY LAW IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

1081

offers yet another measure of insight into how he values the legal
interests of the poor:
Now and then you get somebody who’s really quite bad,
but more often I am startled by the fact that this young
woman who is a, you know, public defender from Podunk
is so good, is so smart, and is so competent, and I ask
myself, “What is she doing, you know, being a public defender in
Podunk? Why isn’t she out inventing the automobile or,
you know, doing something useful?” I mean, I – you
know, I’m being sarcastic, I suppose, but it is the fact that
we devote, in my view, too many of our best and brightest
119
minds to the law.
Justice Scalia’s suggestion, that lawyers who devote their lives
to the cause of justice by representing the poor and the
disenfranchised in small and out-of-the-way towns and cities across
the country are not doing important work that benefits society,
offers a cramped understanding of the promise of our legal
institutions. An eloquent rejoinder to Justice Scalia’s questioning
of why a lawyer might want to serve the poor in an obscure corner
of the country was offered almost thirty years ago by Professor
Clinton Bamberger in his commencement address to the 1981
graduating class of the School of Law of the University of
120
Bamberger explained to the gathered students
Pennsylvania.
and their families and friends: “[t]he best of a lawyer’s work is to
create with the law. The best of this work is to find in law rights,
dignity, and status and to free these forces for people who would
121
not have them but for the law and your application.”
Last fall I had two guest speakers in my poverty law class, both
of whom are poverty lawyers. Gregory Schell has spent three
decades in rural communities in Florida and on the Delmarva
Peninsula helping assert rights for and give dignity to thousands of
122
Miriam Harmatz, for nearly
the nation’s migrant farm workers.
the same amount of time, has fought tirelessly to expand
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Bamberger, supra note 84, at 10.
121. Id. at 11.
122. In 2004, Schell was the recipient of the National Legal Aid & Defender
Association’s prestigious Reginald Heber Smith Award. Press Release, Nat’l Legal
Aid and Defender Org., Gregory Schell Nationally Honored for Outstanding Work
on
Behalf
of
Migrant
Farmworkers
(2004),
available
at
http://www.nlada.org/News/News_Press_Releases/2004110533281567.
Schell
was recognized for his many years of effective advocacy on behalf of the nation’s
farm workers. Id.
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healthcare access for the poor in Florida and to protect their rights
under the Medicaid Program. Harmatz has used her legal skills
and intellect to give both hope and better health to thousands of
sick and impoverished men, women, and children throughout
123
Florida.
In November, Harmatz brought to life the byzantine
provisions of the federal Medicaid statute through the compelling
narratives of the poorest and sickest Floridians’ struggles to survive.
Schell, who is the Managing Attorney of Florida Legal Services,
Inc.’s Migrant Farmworker Justice Project in Lake Worth, Florida,
spoke to the class in September of 2008 about the importance of
legal counsel and the ways in which the poor’s access to legal
counsel has been burdened. Following class, two students and I
took him out for lunch. On the way back, Greg Schell shared that
Chief Justice John Roberts was his classmate at Harvard Law
School, a very nice man, and one of the smartest persons he knew.
Greg Schell’s personal connection to Chief Justice John
Roberts has stayed with me, perhaps because both men clearly have
brilliant legal minds and have been accomplished and gifted
124
I suppose it is
lawyers, yet each chose different paths in the law.
the symmetry of their gifted legal minds and the asymmetry of their
career choices. Like Robert Frost’s two roads that diverged in a
125
wood, Greg Schell took the road less travelled, and for thousands
of the nation’s impoverished farm workers, that has made all the
difference.
The place and role of poverty law in today’s law school
curriculum is to ensure that more students take what has
traditionally been the road less travelled, and to ensure that all law
students understand the direct and immediate relationship
between poverty and injustice, including how both burden
123. Miriam Harmatz was a co-recipient of the Florida Bar Foundation’s 2006
Steven M. Goldstein Award for her work on an advocacy project aimed at insuring
that impoverished Floridians receive medically necessary medications authorized
under federal law and that their due process rights are protected. See generally
2006 Steven M. Goldstein Award for Excellence, http://www.floridalegal.org/
News/Goldstein%20Awards/Rx%20project.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). The
advocacy included both legislative advocacy and class action litigation. Id. Both
Harmatz and Schell work for Florida Legal Services, Inc., a nonprofit legal
organization that provides a range of legal services to Florida’s poor. See generally
Florida Legal Services, Inc. http://www.floridalegal.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
124. Greg Schell has litigated numerous federal decisions that have benefited
tens of thousands of migrant workers across the nation. See, e.g., Arriaga v. Fla.
Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2002).
125. ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN (1915).
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126

democracy.
For this reason, it remains vitally important that
there continue to be calls for law schools to embrace a social justice
mission. It matters not whether such calls are targeted with
127
128
There is room for
humility or raised as a social call to arms.
both approaches in the discourse. What matters most is that, as a
nation, we continue to strive to give greater content to the meaning
and understanding of equal justice. That important undertaking
rightfully should be a principal responsibility of our law schools.

126. Rose, supra note 66, at 446 (“Access to our legal system represents access
to one of the . . . vital organs of American democracy.”).
127. Failinger, supra note 62, at 1175.
128. William P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the Root Causes of
Poverty and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 162 (2006).
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